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THE "LIBERALISM" OF CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES
SAMUEL HENDEL*
Charles Evans Hughes ascended the bench as Chief Justice of the
United States in February 1930 in the midst of the most serious and
steadily worsening economic crisis in American history; a crisis which
was to put the institution of judicial review, the Court, and the leader-
ship of its Chief Justice to their severest test. "One may search in
vain," said Harlan F. Stone, "for a period in the history of the Supreme
Court in which the burden resting on the Chief Justice has been
so heavy or when his task has been more beset with difficulties."1
Now, twenty years after the bitter controversies that stirred the
nation as many vital New Deal measures fell before the Court and
an attempt was made to "pack" the Court itself, and more than fifteen
years after the retirement of Chief Justice Hughes on July 1, 1941,
it may be possible to appraise his record with close regard for the
evidence and with some dispassion.
Hughes brought to his tasks as Chief Justice a wide range of ex-
perience, a penetrating mind, and qualities of character that con-
tributed to his skilled leadership of the Court in a period of crisis
and marked him as one of its great "Chiefs." "He took his seat at the
center of the Court," Mr. Justice Frankfurter tells us, "with a mastery,
I suspect, unparalleled in the history of the Court, a mastery that
derived from his experience, as diversified, as intense, as extensive,
as any man ever brought to a seat on the Court, combined with a very
powerful and acute mind that could mobilize these vast resources in
the conduct of the business of the Court.... To see him -preside was
like witnessing Toscanini lead an orchestra. '2 And elsewhere he says of
Hughes that "He never checked free debate, but the atmosphere which
he created, the moral authority which he exerted, inhibited irrelevance,
repetition, and fruitless discussion. . . .He also showed uncommon
resourcefulness in drawing elements of agreement out of differences
and thereby narrowing, if not always escaping, conflicts."3
Hughes' superb skill in the conduct of the work of the Court is of
considerable importance in any inclusive appraisal of his record. But
it is obvious that his place in history as Chief Justice will depend
primarily on the role he played with respect to the great constitutional
*Professor of Government, City College of New York.
1. Stone, The Chief Justice, 27 A.B.A.J. 407 (1941).
2. Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REv. 883, 901 (1953).
3. Frankfurter, "The Administrative Side" of Chief Justice Hughes, 63
HARV. L. Rzv. 1, 3 (1949). See also McElwain, The Business of the Supreme
Court as Conducted by Chief Justice Hughes, 63 HARV. L. Rav. 5 (1949).
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issues that came before the Court and, in this connection, I turn first
to certain general propositions.
It is a truism-no longer seriously controverted-that a justice
brings to his tasks certain social, economic, intellectual, and po-
litical predilections derived from his background, training, and
experience. And it has also been recognized, as Felix Frankfurter has
written, that the "words of the Constitution," upon which the solution
of constitutional problems frequently depend, "are so unrestricted by
their intrinsic meaning or by their history or by tradition or by prior
decisions that they leave the individual justice free, if indeed, they do
not compel him, to gather meaning not from reading the Constitu-
tion but from reading life.' 4 What is just as true, if less frequently ex-
plicitly acknowledged, is that those who concern themselves with
evaluating the work of the justices are also freighted with particular
biases. Accordingly, I herewith declare that with respect to the period
under examination, I am much more prone to find wisdom in the
opinions of, let us say, Justices Brandeis and Cordozo than, for ex-
ample, in those of Justices Butler and McReynolds.
I have just suggested that bias derived from the value-systems of
justices and legal writers inevitably and inexorably intrude them-
selves in their opinions and comments. It is understandable, there-
fore, that much of the discussion in legal circles and the press with
respect to the Hughes court should turn upon the relative liberalism of
the justices.5 And I agree that the liberal-conservative criteria, how-
ever lacking in comprehensiveness, are more meaningful and better
calculated to reveal operative biases and the social consequences of
decision than any other criteria.
It is true, of course, that the concept of liberalism admits of a variety
of definitions. It certainly differs in content when used, on the one
hand, by T. H. Green or Walter Lippman and, on the other, by L. T.
Hobhouse or Harold J. Laski. But in the terms that marked Holmes,
Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo, as liberals, and Butler, Sutherland,
Van Devanter and McReynolds, as conservatives, I assume that the
liberals were those who displayed greater solicitude for civil liberties
and civil rights than for property rights and revealed a marked dis-
position to sustain social and economic reforms.
These, then, are the criteria in terms of which I shall attempt an
appraisal of Chief Justice Hughes' record on the Court. But, first, it is
4. The Supreme Court, 3 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 68, 69 (1949).
5. See, e.g., KELLY AND HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 727 (1948);
PERKINS, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC STATESMANSHIP
185 (1956); RODELL, NINE MEN 213-99 (1955); SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT 780 (1943); Mason, Charles Evans Hughes: An Appeal
to the Bar of History, 6 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1952); Brant, How Liberal is Justice




necessary to deal with the denial of his authorized biographer, Mr.
Merlo J. Pusey, that these criteria had any great relevance to Hughes'
role in the Court. Basing his work in considerable part upon conversa-
tions with the Chief Justice and upon his private papers, Mr. Pusey
writes: "One of the most striking characteristics of Hughes' work on
the bench was his high degree of objectivity .... He was an open-
minded judge .... In a large measure Hughes succeeded in freeing
his judicial reasoning from any social or economic pattern .... The
human mind does not operate independently of its experience. But
Hughes' basic intellectual loyalty was to the idea of justice itself....
For him justice was not a means to an end; it was the end." In 1932,
Hughes is quoted as replying to a question whether he was a liberal or
conservative: "A judge who does his work in an objective spirit, as
a judge should, will address himself conscientiously to each case, and
will not trouble himself about labels."
'6
It is revealing to observe that while Pusey rejects the liberal label
for Hughes, how sedulously he contrasts his record with that of such
"rock-ribbed" and "dogged" conservatives as Butler and McReynolds.
More important is the fact that "justice"--meaningful as a philo-
sophical concept and in the contest of purely private rights-was ap-
pealed to by all sides in the great public controversies that divided
the Court and seldom, if ever, furnished any accepted or agreed guide
to decisions. The differences among the justices, therefore, if we are
to credit all with sincere convictions and basic integrity-the con-
servatism of Butler no less than the crusading zeal of Brandeis-de-
rived not from the unequivocal dictates of "justice" but from the
intellectual commitments of the justices.
It does not follow from the foregoing that Hughes must be categori-
cally forced into either a clearly defined "liberal" or "conservative"
position, and my basic quarrel is precisely with those who have sought
to do so. Few justices, in my opinion, have more successfully eluded
such characterization. My own conclusion is that Hughes' record was
decidedly liberal on issues of civil liberties and civil rights and
moderately conservative on issues of social and economic reform. This
view, I recognize, will bring little comfort to those who prefer easily
identifiable heroes and villains-however variously the roles may be
assigned. But I believe it to be the only view fully consistent with
the evidence; and a significant conclusion which goes far to explain
Hughes' ambivalence, his clinging to outmoded precedents in the
process of their repudiation, and, given the composition of the Court,
his balance of power position. And, Mr. Pusey notwithstanding, it
helps explain his heightened'sensitivity to political considerations.
6. 2 PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HurmEs 691 (1951).
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I now propose to test my thesis by references to the record of
Hughes: (1) before he became Chief Justice; (2) as Chief Justice
in respect to civil liberties and civil rights issues; and (3) as Chief
Justice in respect to issues of economic significance.
I
No Chief Justice in American history came to the Court with great-
er diversity of public experience than Hughes. If it may be said that
some of this experience marked him as a "conservative," it may with
equal validity be said that much of this experience marked him as a
"liberal." On the conservative side, inter alia, may be placed his Re-
publican Party presidential candidacy against Wilson in 1916; his
subsequent support of the candidacies of Harding, Coolidge, and
Hoover; as Secretary of State from 1921 to 1925, his "narrow and un-
comprehending insistence at all costs on the most extreme interpre-
tation of American property rights, notably in our oil diplomacy and
our relations with Mexico and Russia";7 and, as acknowledged leader
of the American Bar, his close affiliation with and representation of
many of the most powerful corporate interests in America.
On the liberal side, on the other hand, may be put his scathing
exposures of powerful gas and insurance company malpractices in
.1905; his noteworthy record of social reforms as Governor of New York
State from 1906 to 1910; his stirring attack in 1920 on the expulsion of
five Socialist members of the New York Assembly, and his castigation
that same year of the indiscriminate use of war powers "after the
military exigency had passed and in conditions for which they were
never intended";8 and, most significantly, his record as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court from 1910 to 1916. In this role, he voted
to sustain exercises of governmental power designed to permit the
self-organization of employees free from employer interference, and
to limit the hours of labor of women and railroad employees. In gen-
eral, he sought to construe public franchises and grants strictly and
to sustain the regulatory and taxing powers of the state against the
claim of contract impairment. On the other hand, he cast his vote to
,deny governmental authority to enact a peonage statute, to limit the
rights of aliens to ordinary employment, or to foster unequal accom-
modations for Negroes in intrastate commerce.9 And, perhaps, most
important of all was his decision in the Shreveport Case (Houston, E.
and W. Texas R.R. v. United States) 10 in which he ruled that Congress
had the authority to subject to its control the purely intrastate rail-
7. Nation, Feb. 12, 1930, p. 165.
8. CEAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 162 (1941).
9. Documentation may be found in HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE
SUPREME COURT cc. 2-5 (1951), and in 1 PUSEY, op. cit. supra note 6, cc. 28, 30.
10. 234U.S. 342 (1914).
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road traffic of a state that impinged upon and had become interwoven
with the interstate railroad traffic of the nation. Small wonder that if
even so vigorous a liberal as Fred Rodell recently characterized these
as "six stunningly liberal years.""
II
With respect to Hughes' record as Chief Justice from 1930 to 1941,
it is significant that no serious challenge has been made to his liberal-
ism on issues of civil liberties and civil rights. In any fair appraisal;
this side of his endeavors ought not to be neglected-especially in
times like these-by an over-concentration upon his economic opinions.
Even a summary recital of Hughes' position in important cases in
which the Court divided speaks eloquently of his devotion to basic
freedoms and equality of rights.
In 1931, Hughes spoke for the Court in upsetting a conviction under
a statute which made display of a red flag a criminal offense; 12 and
dissented against the Court's decision to deny citizenship to one who
would not commit himself in advance to bear arms in defense of the
United States.13 His dissent, to be sure, turned on the question of con-
gressional intention but his own sympathies were made patent when
he wrote: "There is abundant room for enforcing the requisite author-
ity of law . . . without demanding that either citizens or applicants
for citizenship shall assume by oath an obligation to regard allegiance
to God as subordinate to civil power." That same year he wrote the
prevailing opinion which struck down a statute that imposed prior
censorship; 14 and the following year, he spoke for the Court in im-
posing the first clear and significant limit on martial law powers of
governors.15
In 1937, in two decisions affecting Communists, he gave broad scope
to constitutional protections of freedom. In the first, he upset a con-
viction which rested upon a statute making it a crime to assist in the
conduct of a meeting called by any organization advocating criminal
syndicalism or sabotage, and took the occasion to say:
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incite-
ments to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the
more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights
of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the
opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may
be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may
be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic,
the very foundation of constitutional government.16
11. RODELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 223.
12. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
13. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
14. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
15. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
16. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
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In the other case, he joined in the majority opinion of Mr. Justice
Roberts -(against four dissents) to invalidate a Georgia statute which
was applied to a Negro Communist charged with attempting to incite
insurrection on the basis of his enrolling activities and possession of
a booklet urging "Self-Determination For the Black Belt.
' 'l?
In general, he aligned himself with those members of the Court
who sought to uphold legislation designed to protect the organizing
activities of labor and to upset legislation designed to restrict those
activities. In 1937 he stood with a narrow majority of the Court which
upheld a state law prohibiting the use of injunctions against peaceful
picketing;18 and the following year he voted to sustain the general
scope and validity of the procedural requirements of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act regulating and limiting the issuance of injunctions in
labor disputes.19 In 1939, he joined a majority of the Court in invali-
dating a Jersey City ordinance prohibiting assemblies on public streets
without official permit.20 In 1940, he concurred in decisions which
brought the right of peaceful picketing and the display of signs within
the scope of "liberty" under the due process clause.21 Only in two
important cases, did he take a restrictive position. In 1941, he agreed
with the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that peaceful
picketing may be enjoined when enmeshed with violent conduct;2 2
and later joined in support of Mr. Justice Roberts' dissenting view
that picketing might be legally enjoined when part of an attempt to
"organize" a business in which none of the employees was or wished to
become a member of the union.23
In the civil rights field, he spoke for the Court in ruling that the
refusal of a state to furnish a Negro facilities for legal education avail-
able to whites within its borders constituted a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws. That right, he said, is not based on race but is a per-
sonal one.24 And subsequently, he joined in the majority of the Court
which struck down an Oklahoma statute designed to restrict the
Negro's right to vote.
25
This record thoroughly justifies the comment of then Attorney Gen-
eral Robert Jackson, on the occasion of Hughes' retirement from the
bench, that- "In the numerous cases dealing with civil liberties he has
been a consistent and forthright champion of the American free-
17. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
18. Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
19. Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); New Negro Alliance Co.
v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
20. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
21. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S.
106 (1940).
22. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
23. AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
24. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
25. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
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doms." 26 Even a severe critic of many of Hughes' economic opinions
was on this occasion impelled to write that "As a jurist, Charles Evans
Hughes will be best remembered as a friend of civil liberties and the,
rights of minorities, particularly that minority which has most needed
protection, the Negro. 2 7
III
An attempt to review Chief Justice Hughes' position on all the im-
portant economic issues that the Court dealt with during his tenure
would make this paper unconscionably prolix. The selected point of
departure, therefore, is to consider the twelve decisions that the Court
handed down during the period from January 1935 to June 1936, while
its composition remained constant, and which President Franklin D.
Roosevelt later said had "fairly completely undermined" his New
Deal program and persuaded him to offer his court-reform bill in
February of 1937.28
It may be noted, at the outset, that in three of the twelve cases cited
by Roosevelt the Court in 1935 had been unanimous in ruling against
the Administration. The first invalidated the Frazier-Lemke Act for
the relief of farm mortgage debtors.29 The second restricted the power
of the president to remove members of independent regulatory com-
missions with whose views the president disagreed.30 The third struck
down the NIRA as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power and as in excess of Congress' interstate commerce regulatory
power.31 In one other case, decided earlier that year, the Court united,
except for the lone dissent of Justice Cardozo, in ruling that a section
of the NIRA which authorized the president to bar the shipment
of "hot oil" across state lines constituted an unlawful delegation of
legislative power.3 2
In the other eight cases, the justices approved of the Administra-
tion's basic position as follows: Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo in all
eight; Hughes in five; Roberts in three; Van Devanter, Sutherland,
and Butler in one; and McReynolds in none. Specifically, in three of
the five cases in which Hughes supported the Administration, however
qualifiedly, he wrote the prevailing opinion. In one, the constitutional
validity of Congress' legislation in barring repayment of private debts
in gold was sustained.3 3 In the companion case, while the obligation of
the United States to honor its promise to pay in gold was deemed
26. Jackson, The Judicial Career of Chief Justice Hughes, 27 A.B.A.J. 408,
409 (1941).
27. Nation, June 14, 1941, p. 685.
28. The Fight Goes On, Collier's, Sept. 20, 1941, p. 48.
29. Louisville Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
30. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
31. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
32. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 389 (1935).
33. Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
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binding on its moral conscience and beyond its power of repudiation,
it was nevertheless held not legally enforceable because individual
damage could not be established.34 In the third case, the validity of a
TVA contract providing for the disposal of surplus energy was
upheld35 In two other cases, Hughes joined the liberals and wrote
telling dissents from the decisions of the Court. In one he attacked the
invalidation of the Railroad Retirement Act which provided pensions
for retired railroad employees 36 and, in the other, he assailed the decla-
ration of unconstitutionality of minimum-wage-for-women legisla-
tion.37
In the three remaining decisions, in which the Administration was
opposed, Hughes aligned himself with the conservatives of the Court:
to approve invalidation of the AAA;38 to support an intemperate
excoriation of the SEC for refusing to permit a registrant to withdraw
an allegedly false or misleading statement; 39 and to upset the Bitumi-
nous Coal Conservation Act of 1935.40 (With respect to his position in
the AAA case, it is an open secret that Hughes argued for constitu-
tional validity but finally voted with the majority to avoid another
5-4 division in the Court.)41
In the period before the court-reform proposal, Hughes took the
conservative position in a number of important cases other than those
named by President Roosevelt. His was the primary responsibility for
hobbling the administrative process with the concept that its find-
ings of fact, to which finality normally attached if supported by sub-
stantial evidence, would be subject to independent judicial determina-
tion when these findings related to "fundamental" or "jurisdictional"
facts 42 or to rate-making where "a large capital investment is involved
and the main issue is as to the alleged confiscation of that invest-
ment. '43 He found himself, too, arrayed with the four conservatives
in striking down an Oklahoma statute that required a license for the
business of manufacturing and selling ice in circumstances in which
chaotic conditions had come to prevail in that industry.
44
On the other hand, in this same period, Hughes joined the liberal
dissenters in opposition to the 5-4 decision of the Court invalidating
the Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934; 45 and spoke for the Court in
34. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
35. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
36. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
37. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
38. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
39. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
40. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
41. RODELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 238.
42. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
43. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
44. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
45. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
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upholding federal legislation barring the shipment of prison-made
goods across state lines.46 Additionally, the Chief Justice joined in an
opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts which in fact, if not in name, reversed
the Court's decision in the "ice" case and sustained the validity of a
New York statute fixing maximum and minimum prices for the sale
of milk.47 Most important of all, perhaps, was his decision sustaining
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act in such sweeping terms as
to suggest that constitutional prohibitions would have to yield to
emergency conditions.
48
In the period of Hughes' tenure on the bench following Roosevelt's
proposal to reform the Court, his record in the economic sphere was
one of almost complete liberalism. Even before the membership of
the Court had been reconstituted and while the court bill was being
debated in Congress, he wrote the opinion of the Court (when Roberts
came over) reversing its decision of less than a year and sustaining
minimum-wage-for-women legislation.49 He also spoke for the Court,
in the face of four conservative dissents, to hold valid the National
Labor Relations Act;5 0 and joined in the 5-4 decision written by Justice
Cardozo which upheld the social security legislation of Congress.
51
Thereafter, with the reconstitution of the Court, with rare dissent,
he joined in the liberal tide.
In reviewing Hughes' positions in economic cases, I have made no
attempt to present the detailed or precise bases of his views, to judge
his consistency or lack of consistency, or to subject his thinking to
close, critical analysis. All of this I have attempted to do elsewhere.
52
My purpose has been the limited one of spreading his record before us
in a broad canvas as a basis for judgment. It is only by rejecting the
partial and highly selective approach that it becomes possible to truly
assess the role of Hughes as Chief Justice and establish that to com-
press him into the mould of either arch conservative or thoroughgoing
liberal is an error. For the rest I must content myself with some more
or less categorical assertions which critical analysis of Hughes' record,
I am convinced, reveals.
I assert, first, that this record, even in its summary form, negatives
the charge that Hughes was a calculating reactionary whose reputation
for liberalism, such as it is, derived almost wholly from the fact that
when the court was liberal, Hughes wrote more than an appropriate
46. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937).
47. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The reference is to New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
48. Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
49. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
50. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
51. Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
52. HENDEL, op. cit. supra note 9.
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share of its decisions and when it was conservative, and he agreed, al-
most never wrote its decisions.
53
Secondly, I believe that although the record shows that there is
some truth in it, it is nevertheless an over-statement to assert, as
Alpheus T. Mason does, with the clear implication that Hughes was
basically an extreme conservative, that "Chief Justice Hughes proved
.himself a particularly fertile source of restrictive interpretation, an
imaginative adapter of old dogma to serve as a sword against the
rising popular demand for effective government.
' 54
Thirdly, I think it contrary to the evidence to pretend, as Merlo J.
Pusey does, that the record of Hughes is "utterly barren of evidence
that he trimmed his principles" or "reversed his judgment," and that
"no other factor" was "as important" in the decisions of the Court after
1937 in sustaining New Deal legislation "as the changes in the character
of the legislation passed-the self-reversal on the part of Congress."55
While I would agree that careful draftsmanship played its part in
making New Deal legislation more palatable to the Court after 1937,
it is almost fantastic to suggest that this was the primary factor. Even
Mr. Pusey acknowledges that "The changed temper of American de-
mocracy" played some part in this change.56 The fact is, too, that few
judges were more adept in clinging to precedents in the very process
of their emasculation or repudiation than Hughes.
57
Finally, I maintain that Hughes' very lack of clear commitment
to conservatism or liberalism in his economic philosophy made him
extraordinarily sensitive-unlike the four arch conservatives-to the
pressures of changing times and political expediency.
53. The charge is that of Brant, supra note 5.
54. Mason, supra note 5, at 8.
55. 2 PusEy, op. cit. supra note 6, at 771.
56. Ibid.
57. This view is thoroughly documented in HENDEL, op. cit. supra note 9.
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